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----------------000----------------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court 
refusiny to modify the Divorce Decree as to property 
seltlement and refusing to grant the Defendant reimbursement 
for money spent on the minor child in Defendant's custody 
prior to the Hearing date. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant brought her Order To Show Cause To Modify the 
Decree so as to require the Plaintiff to pay to her her equity 
in the home upon Plaintiff's remarriage; to obtain contribution 
from the Plaintiff for expenses incurred for support of the 
p~1t1~s minor child in her custody prior to the Hearing date 
ar,d r'"r an award of child support for said minor child. 
'I l1rc r'ourt found that there was no change of circumstances 
'' 1 rt tu j us ti fy the modification of the property 
'"rd ,icirccment, refused to require contribution on the 
part of the Plaintiff for cxp<cn,;c:s <it [)( f, I<d" 1 
Plaintiff still had custody cc'.' the i rt l' 
minor children, dn,J m, d \ )l It 'c I 
in Defendant's custudy Cil1u llLil 1<'1 the ,,]c], 
Plaintiff's custody off-set each nth('r dnd, !he 1 , 
ordered no support for those children. The L'uu rt 
the child support required to be paid by the Du, r. L 
the other minor child in Plaintiff's custody t· ,,,,, 
DOLLARS ($75.00) per month. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests the Cuurt t• "' 
the decision of the lower Court in all respect~, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced by the DL' 
Court of Davis County after sixteen (16) years cf m~i:,, 
on August 26, 1981. The divorce to become final th, c 
months after date of entry (Rp.12). The part1t>s lnJ 
(3) minor children, to-wit: ROBERT CARL STETTLH, I )c:' 
STETTLER, und MATTHEW STETTLER, who were 15, l: ,ir,d" 
of age, respectively, at the time the Complaint w"' 
(Rp .1). 
At the time of the filing of the Cumr,lau,L ''' 
had been sc:parated fur appruximc1lcl\' 
separation and divorce v..rci·L r_dU.St·,1 
DcfcncJanL 1 s inv()lvc·rn( ril y.,,·1t_h hr! i l r _,1 ·1 1 ),'1 
she met at her 1Jlacc of cmpl(1ymc,11t d!1d ,1t ( 1 1~ 1 • 1 1 
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l • 1,, •·•,ming fin.:ll in December of 1981 (Tp.10, 30). 
"·mrJlaint being filed as a result of her 
, ,, 11' "'' i lh her present husband, the Defendant left the 
t Ji, ]":irt ies, and the Plaintiff and the minor children 
~1nu• cl \c; li'.'e in the home. At the time of the filing 
t I" ,-,Jm1,laint the parties entered into a Stipulation (Rp . 
... 1:, ·h Defendant reviewed and understood (Tp. 10). Under 
t[,, t._·1ms of the Stipulation, Plaintiff was awarded the 
. 11jt ,_,d; ,,f lhe children and Defendant agreed to pay ONE 
Ht ·:oc:r:o DOLLARS ($100. 00) per month per child to assist with 
':1•_ ll •Cc.ire and agreed that Plaintiff be awarded the home and 
: L.1l ->he be paid her share of the equity upon the sale of 
h·.me or when the youngest child reached 18 years, 
v.r.:·..:h .. v,·r occured first. Subsequently on August 26, 1981 
.1 IJcL' "e of Divorce was entered by the Court incorporating 
tr," t,_·ims of the Decree (Rp. 11). 
l\1 thL· time of the Decree, Defendant was employed at 
11111 Air Furce Base in a very responsible position which 
'--!Ult-··d her to work with other people and carry out 
s1qn1fi, ant management responsibilities (Tp. 32, 33). 
In October of 1981 she quit her job and went to 
,, ::1, v.·1th her present husband (Tp. 33) whom she later 
JI< Ii< ,·,.mf>Cr of 1981 (Tp. 10, 30). 
, tl1c· ·er1od from October 1981 to December 1981 
11 I" l11nJ in child support (Tp. 18), and as of 
I , 1 , 1 llL·c.!t· 1 ng, there remained a balance owing to the 
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Plaintiff of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE ($875.00) DOLL/\!<: 
as stipulated by the parties (R}" 2'J). 
In June of 1982 the parties' minor daughter wenl 1, 
visit the Defendant (Tp. 12) and subsequently the parties 
agreed that the best interest of the daughter would be scr'.'e 
by her permanent custody being transferred to the DefendaGt. 
A Stipulation was signed transferring custody in November 
of 1982 (Rp. 14) and the Order was signed by the Court on 
December 3, 1982 (Rp. 16). 
Since the date of separation until June 1982, Pla1ntir; 
had the care and custody of the three (3) minor children an; 
acted as both father and mother to them. He still retains 
custody of the two (2) boys of the parties, age 12 and 17 
( Tp . 2 5 , 4 5) . 
On February 15, 1983 Defendant filed an Order To Show 
Cause requesting that the Decree of Divorce previously 
entered be modified (Rp. 19). She requested that she be 
awarded child support for the minor child in her custody; 
that Plaintiff be required to reimburse her for certain 
monies which she had expended on the child in her custody 
prior to the date of the Hearing and that the Decree be 
modified to require the Plaintiff to pay to Defendant her 
equity in the family home upon his remarriage. The Pl dJ ,,t_ 
filed a Counter Affidavit asking for a Judgm<Cnt f"r ,it 1· 
in child support and an increase of support for the tw,, 
minor children in his custody (Rp. 25). 
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The matter came on for Hearing on the 11th day of March 
JYRJ and the Court, after hearing the testimony of the 
~,1rt1es, ordered that the Plaintiff be granted Judgment for 
back child support in the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY 
FIVE ($875.00) DOLLARS; that the cost of care of the child 
in Defendant's custody and the oldest son in Plaintiff's 
custody off-set each other and, therefore, cancelled each 
other out; reduced the support required to be paid by the 
Defendant for the other minor child in Plaintiff's custody 
to SEVENTY FIVE ($75.00) DOLLARS per month and further ruled 
that there was no change in circumstances sufficient to cause 
a change in the Decree relating to payment of equity in the 
home to the Defendant (Rp. 31 - 36). 
From the Court's Order the Appellant took this Appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in finding 
that there were no substantial and material change in 
circumstances sufficient to modify the property settlement 
agreement. 
2. Whether the Court abused its discretion in refusing 
to require Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for the expenses 
ur child care she incurred while the minor child was in her 
( li:-;t(!dy prior to Hearing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I . 
THE COURT DID NOT ABllSJ: ITS DlSCHETllJN TN 
RULING THAT THERE WAS NU CHANGE: IN C lHCUM-
STANCES SUFFICIENT TO ,JUSTIFY A MODIFICA-
TION OF THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AS lNCUR-
PORATED IN THE DECREE. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the burden is 
on the Appellant to prove that evidence clearly prepondeer.,t. 
against the findings as made, and that there was a misundr·r-
standing or misapplication of law resulting in substantial 
prejudicial error, or that serious inequity has resulted " 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Mitchell vs. ----
Mitchell, Utah, 527 P2d 1359 (1974). The Mitchell Court we< 
on to say that in divorce actions, the trial Court has 
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting financial 
property interests, and its actions are indulged with a 
presumption of validity; and that the court's determinatio:1, 
based on the Courts review of the facts and circumstancos, 
should not be overturned unless it results in such manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of 
discretion. Mitchell vs. Mitchell, supra, at pagu 1360. 
In Despain vs. Despain, Utah, 610 P2d 1303 (April 11, 
1980), the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
That in both the formulation of a Divurcc Deer · 
and any modifications thereof, the Tr i.il Cou rl 1' 
vested with broad discrel1ondry l'ow0rs wil1c·h 111.1·, 
disturbed by the appelL:ite Court only rn tile: 11· 
of a clear abuse thereof. Paqu 1305 
The Court went on to say that in the c1bsencec "! 
compelling equitable cons1derat1ons, the tc·rms •<I ,1 prurc 
settlement arc not be abrogated. 
,11 l'"'l'' 130G. 
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Despain vs. Despain, supra, 
There is no question that under State Law the Court has 
~untinuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or 
new orders with respect to the distribution of property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary. UCA, 1953, Section 30-
3-5. 
The Courts in interpreting State Law have stated that 
in order to provide some stability to decrees, and to prevent 
an inundation of the Courts with Petitions For Modification, 
a party seeking a modification must demonstrate a substantial 
change of circumstances and that the change in circumstances 
required to justify a modification of a Divorce Decree varies 
with the type of modification sought. Haslam vs. Haslam, 
Utah, 657 P2d 757, (1982); Christensen vs. Christensen, Utah, 
G28 P2d 1297 (1981) 
As here, in the case of modification of a Decree 
involving real property, the Court should be reluctant to 
grant modification of the provisions of the Divorce Decree 
which dispose of real property and grant such modifications 
only upon a showing of compelling reasons arriving from 
substantial and material changes in circumstances. Foulger 
vc.o. F_oulge_r, Utah, 626 P2d 412 (1981); (emphasis supplied). 
'I'll<' Courl has also said that property settlements, when 
'"' '" purated into the Decree of Divorce, are entitled to a 
'llcdt,,r s,rnctity than alimony and support payments in 
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proceedings to modify Decrees; and that thcr0 aunn1c1l1"r 1 
should only be resorted tu with 1 1n.J1tr'ltJc'\111,·, •1< 1 1 t 
compelling reasons. Land vs. Lar1_1l, 111,th, b05 ! 1 .'d lii~, 
(19 80) . 
In the matter here before the Court the evidence si"''"'" 
that the Defendant entered into the Property Settlement 
Agreement knowingly, that she read it and apparently 
understood it ( Tp. 9) • The records showed that she worked 
at Hill Air Force Base for four (4) years prior to the 
divorce as an audit manager and dealt with people and was 
in charge of certain responsibilities (Tp. 33). She wcls u;c 
to dealing with people and handling her own affairs. At 
time did she allege that she had been mislead or did nut 
understand the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. 
The only question to be decided by the Court was whetc! 
the fact that her daughter had come to live with her and 
remarriage and that of the Plaintiff were such as to 
constitute a substantial and material change in circwnstar"_·, 
such as to justify a modification of Decree. 
The record points out that the Defendant voluntar1li 
left her husband and her children and her stable home t" 
continue a relationship which started at her work and er,Ji_, 
in her marriage to the individual who is hL·r prc·s• n1 ll 1 1 
( Tp. 3 0, 31) . 
Plaintiff remained with the part icos' childr"11 ""! 
continued to provide them with a stablc home clnd humc J 11 1 
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a11d still h"s custody of two (2) of the parties' three (3) 
,·h1ld1,c·n (T[' 45). All of the circumstances upon which the 
lwl' ncJ.·rnt rc.·1 ico; lo justify a modification of the Decree were 
tn a large extent created by the Defendant, of her own 
choice, and one which could be easily contemplated by her 
at the time the Agreement was made. 
In a recent case decided by this Court, the Court 
refused to modify a Decree with terms very similar to those 
before the Court where the equity from the home was to be 
distributed to the Defendant upon sale. Defendant requested 
modification of the Decree to provide for payment upon 
remarriage. The Defendant argued if she had been represented 
by counsel, the Decree would have provided for equity 
distribution on remarriage of the Plaintiff. The Supreme 
Court, in upholding the lower Court's decision not to modify 
the Decree, stated that the threshhold requirement for relief 
is a showing of a substantial change in circumstances of the 
parties occurring since the entry of the Decree and not 
contemplated by the parties. Lea vs. Bowers, Utah, 658 P2d, 
1213, (1983). 
In the matter here before the Court, the Court ruled 
lhal there was nu showing of a substantial change of 
,. 1 1 ,·1unstdr1L.l'S Jnci th3.t since there is no such showing, the 
•• 1. 1 s tee; 1uLlical.::i (Pp. 33). 
Th« '-"•u1 t w.1s JUStified in ruling that the question of 
n1• ·di 1 iL·at ion uf Decree in regards to property settlement was 
-10-
res judicata based on its findings thut thc;rc were tic' ,-i-,, 
circumstances. McLane vs. ~Lane, Utah, 570 P2d G92, I' 
Smith vs. Smith, Utuh, 564 Pld JO/, (l'J77) 
Based upon the furL"qu1rFJ and tht: circumstanc1_s ('t t 
case, there is no substantial und materiul chc.rngc in 
circumstances such as to justify the modification of th~ 
Decree as to property settlement and the Court in so rul1 
did not abuse its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF TO 
REIMBURSE THE DEFENDANT FOR EXPENSES OF 
CHILD CARE SHE INCURRED WHILE THE MINOR 
WAS IN HER CUSTODY PRIOR TO HEARING 
Again it should be pointed out that the Judgment of 
Trial Court in determining the question of child support 
should be given considerable difference due to the Triul 
Court's advantaged position and should not be disturbed 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, 
or the Trial Court abuses its discretion or misapplies 
principals of law. Christensen vs. Christensen, Utah, G"' 
P2d 1297, (1981); Fletcher vs. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P~d L'.: 
( 1980) . 
The law is clear thut both parents have an ubliq~t1 
to support their children, UCA Section 78-45-3 dncl lo-
4; however, it is equully clear that <'nforccmc•11t 
support obligation in domestic relations m.1ttcrs i.1tc·"' 
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tho L·untcxt uf 0 Motion To Modify A Decree are governed by 
sc.·t iun J0-3-S, UCA, and not by the provision of the Uniform 
'1·•il L1c1bility For Support Act set forth in Chapter 45 of 
1tl1 78, UCA. Mecham vs. Mecham, Utah, 570 P2d 123, (1977) 
All of the cases cited by the Defendant in regards to 
Lhc obligation of a parent to support his or her child arose 
in the context of the State seeking reimbursement for funds 
expended on behalf of a child of the parent. Not as here, 
in the context of a parent having custody of one child 
seeking rcimbursment from a parent who had custody of the 
parties' other two (2) children. 
The Defendant readily admitted that the cost of 
supporting each of the two (2) children in Plaintiff's 
custody greatly exceeded her ONE HUNDRED DOLLAR ($100.00) 
per month per child contribution (Tp. 35). 
Defendant admitted that she expended considerable sums 
of money for clothing (Tp. 32), hair care (Tp. 23), allowance 
(Tp. 24) and other activities for the daughter in her care, 
totaling approximately FIFTEEN to SIXTEEN HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($1, Sl!O. 00 to $1, GOO. 00) (Tp. 25). Plaintiff stated that 
he could not afford those kinds of expenditures for the child 
(Tp. 46, 47) and that his income had gone down some since 
tlk ncc,·rc<c \·Us ,•ntcrcd (Tp. 43), and that his take-home was 
1 \,111" 1111t~lll<l:ll T\vENT'i T\'10 DOLLARS ($1,222.00) per month (Tp. 
II· l• ,;t 11 H·d tll.1t the two (2) boys who continue to 
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reside with him were now 11 years old and 1 7 yc·"rs old 
respectively and the cxpendi Lun·s t ,-, Ll i ,,,. t hc·m h icl ''". 
steadily as they had grown 11ldc·1 (Tp. cJG). lie lL'c;t it 1._c! 
he had remarried and that his wife made approximately 
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000.00) per year (TfJ. 51). 
The record further shows that the Defendant was full; 
employed with a regular income (Tp. 18) and that her prescc 
husband has an annual income of approximately THIRTY FOUR 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($34,000.00) and that there was only one 
(1) child in their home, that being the daughter of the 
parties' (Tp. 52). 
The facts presented show that Defendant did spend 
approximately FIFTEEN HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,500.00) (Rp. 32) 
on her daughter over a nine (9) month period. The same 
daughter who, along with her two sons and husband, she hJd 
left for her present husband in 1981. 
The monies she expended on the child, to sooth her n1-::· 
conscience or for whatever purpose, were not alone for 
necessities and were greatly in excess of what would have 
been spent had the daughter remained with her father (Tp. 
46) . 
It is important to note that the Decree specificallv 
provided that the Defendant pay support for her cl<n1qhtu 
the amount of ONE HUNDRED DULLl\HS ($100.00) !'»l mr•ntJ, 1 
11-13). This Order had not bL'cn m<ldifi<·d u1 'IL1n·1• ,; 
the Court and, therefore, was still in effect. This h'd :~ 
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a case where no support order had been entered as stated by 
the Defendant so as to invoke the provision of Section 78-
4'J- 7 UCA. 
The record shows that Plaintiff continues to have 
custody and care for the two (2) minor sons of the parties' 
and expenses have continued to increase (Tp. 46) and that 
he continues to pay debts and obligations remaining from the 
marriage of the parties (Tp. 51) on an income which has 
diminished somewhat since the time of the Decree (Tp. 43). 
From the foregoing it is clear that the Court in light 
of the circumstances did not abuse its discretion or misapply 
any principal of law in refusing to require the Plaintiff 
to reimburse Defendant for monies spent on the child in her 
custody prior to the time of Hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court in refusing to modify the 
Property Settlement Agreement incorporated into the Decree 
and refusing to order Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for 
money spent on the child in her custody up to the day of 
Hearing was supported by the evidence and should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of September, 
A.D., 1983. 
HESS, VAN WAGENEN, PAGE & HESS 
Attorney Plaintiff-Respondent 
40 South 125 East 
Clearfield, UT 84015 
Telephone No: (801) 825-2225 
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